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“Unsound” minds and broken bodies: the detention of “hardcore” Mau Mau women at Kamiti and Gitamayu Detention Camps in Kenya, 1954–1960

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From 1954 to 1960, the British detained approximately 8000 women under the Emergency Powers imposed to combat the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya. Kamiti Detention Camp was the main site of women’s incarceration, and its importance has been widely acknowledged by scholars. However, new documentary evidence released from the Hanslope Park Archive since 2011 has revealed the existence of a second camp established for women at Gitamayu, created in 1958 explicitly to deal with the remaining “hardcore” female detainees. This article examines the British struggle to contend with the hardcore Mau Mau women in the final years of the Emergency Period, one that was marked by uncertainty, violence, and an increasing reliance on ethno-psychiatry. Debates about how to deal with this group of women engaged and perplexed the highest levels of the colonial administration, generating tensions between legal, political, and medical officials. At the center of these debates was the question of the female detainees’ sanity, with some officials pressing for these women to be classified as insane. The charge that hardcore women were “of unsound mind” was used for a variety of purposes in the late 1950s, including covering up the abuses in the camps. Examining the British approach to these detainees illuminates how ideas about gender, deviancy, and mental health shaped colonial practices of punishment.

Keywords: Mau Mau Rebellion; Kenya; colonial rule; violence; deviancy; ethno-psychiatry; detention; women

On 13 February 1959, Sir Alan Lennox-Boyd, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote a secret dispatch to Sir Evelyn Baring, Governor of Kenya, attaching a copy of a letter he had recently received in London from a group of “hardcore” female detainees at Kamiti Detention Camp. Smuggled out of the camp, and then out of Kenya, the letter appealed to the “Second Queen Elizabeth” and “all members” of the House of Commons for an end to the “trouble” faced by the women detainees at Kamiti.¹ The women spoke of their experiences at a place named “Kitamayu,” a camp three miles from Kamiti, in which they alleged they were “screened by force” and “beat much.”² The women stated that they were “withered” and “lame” as a result of these beatings: “We cannot walk because we are hurt,” they explained.³ These complaints were among a catalog of accusations that were by early 1959 surfacing in relation to the growing violence of Kenya’s detention camps, with opposition MPs regularly raising concerns about British actions in Kenya in the House of Commons.⁴ Anticipating that there might

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soon be further questions in parliament about the conditions of Kamiti and “Kitamayu,” Lennox-Boyd requested that Baring investigate the treatment of these women, and asked for specific information on the “progress” of those Mau Mau women still in detention.⁵

“Kitamayu,” or more correctly Gitamayu (as the named is rendered in the colonial archive), was from June 1958 to April 1959 home to a group of “hardcore” female Mau Mau detainees.⁶ Initially set up as a satellite of the Kamiti Prison and Detention Camp, Gitamayu was intended to facilitate the intensive “rehabilitation” of those “hardcore” women who remained in detention within Kamiti. Both Kamiti and Gitamayu were part of the “pipeline” of nearly 100 detention camps set up under Emergency Powers by the British in response to the Mau Mau Rebellion, between October 1952 and January 1960. Through these camps, in which those suspected of Mau Mau sympathies could be detained without trial, the British waged a war against the civilian population, introducing a program of “rehabilitation” that was intended to purge detainees of their support for and affiliations with the Mau Mau movement. Even though the forest war against Mau Mau had effectively come to an end by the close of 1956, it would take the British nearly four years more to clear the “pipeline” of the thousands of detainees still incarcerated.

Although the “pipeline” system has been extensively described, and the impact and consequences of tortures and abuses analyzed by historians such as Anderson and Elkins, the existence of Gitamayu has only recently come to light through the release of newly uncovered archival evidence in the Hanslope Park Disclosure.⁷ These files, which numbered over 1500, were uncovered in 2011 by historians working on the London High Court case between the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Kenyan plaintiffs who were held in detention camps during the Emergency Period.⁸ Deemed to be too “sensitive” to fall into the hands of the Kenyan Government, the documents were moved out of Kenya by the British prior to independence.⁹ The files have been crucial in the London High Court Case, as their contents reveal how senior British officials sanctioned the use of force against Mau Mau detainees in the camps in a systematic manner, stretching the legal limits of legitimate violence.¹⁰ The documents relating to Kamiti and Gitamayu reveal how this systematic use of violence was extended to hardcore women and the various ways colonial officials tried to cover it up.

This article will use the Hanslope material to explore the British struggle with the hardcore women at Kamiti and Gitamayu, focusing on the relationship between colonial ideas about female deviancy and practices of colonial punishment. The intensity of this struggle, and the trajectory it took, has been overlooked by previous scholarly works on Mau Mau women, which have provided a more general overview of female involvement in the movement and their detention at Kamiti.¹¹ Much more is known about hardcore men, themselves the authors of over a dozen Mau Mau memoirs and the subject of extensive scholarly analysis. The stories and identities of these men, from Jomo Kenyatta to J.M. Kariuki, are known and lionized.¹² The hardcore male camps, such as Manyani, Athi River, and Hola, are remembered as the sites of epic struggles between detainees and warders, where resistance against colonial oppression continued. Recent work from Anderson has detailed the British policy toward hardcore males, which became more brutal and systematic after 1957.¹³

In contrast, the history of women’s detention has not been investigated in detail, especially in the latter years of the Emergency Period. As this article will demonstrate, women’s punishment broadly followed a pattern similar to that of their male counterparts, with increasing severity of treatment characterizing the final phase of incarceration as the British endeavored to compel inmates to confess their crimes. But the story of the female detainees at Gitamayu and Kamiti also reveals unique elements that were determined by

colonial ideas about female deviancy, these ultimately becoming the defining feature of incarceration for Mau Mau's hardcore women. Scholars such as Elkins, Presley, and Santoru have explored the gendered stereotypes that were applied to female detainees at Kamiti, namely, the assumption that women were malleable and could be easily persuaded away from the Mau Mau cause.¹⁴ Elkins provides some analysis of hardcore female detainees, but it is limited due to the lack of information available on Gitamayu at the time of her research. However, the Hanslope archives reveal the strategies that the colonial administration employed to deal with hardcore women in the late 1950s. The expectation of women's malleability greatly diminished during this time, and was replaced with a discourse of madness, as certain elements of the colonial administration pressed for hardcore women to be classified as insane. This move was instrumental rather than genuine, meant to explain away women's physical ailments in order to cover up mistreatment in the camps.

This article addresses the asymmetry in our understanding of hardcore Mau Mau detainees, focusing on the detention of women in the latter stages of the Emergency Period. First, it will provide an overview of women's roles in the Mau Mau Rebellion, and the initial schemes for their rehabilitation at Kamiti. The bulk of the article will then focus on the experiences of the hardcore women, examining the initial debates about how to deal with them, the rehabilitation scheme adopted at Gitamayu, violence against detainees, and, finally, debates about their mental health. The case of hardcore female detainees illuminates how colonial conceptions of deviancy were gendered, changed over time, informed practices of punishment, and were a key arena of struggle among different elements of the colonial administration. Hardcore Mau Mau women confounded the British, occupying the attention of the highest levels of the colonial administration and defying expectations about normative feminine behavior. Although fewer in number than male detainees, their history forms a central chapter in the Mau Mau Rebellion, one characterized by violence, resistance, and contested ideas about deviancy.

Mau Mau women

The Mau Mau Rebellion was one of the most violent uprisings in the history of colonial Africa. "Mau Mau" was a phrase evoked in hushed tones or virulent anger, the words themselves harboring a certain evil quality among the white settler population.¹⁵ Interchangeably called "rebels," "gangsters," "terrorists," "savages," and a whole host of other denigrating terms, the Mau Mau was a movement made up of largely of Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru peoples against the colonial government. The Kikuyu dominated the movement, propelled to act as a result of profound land alienation by white settlers and political marginalization.¹⁶ Unimpressed by the rather inept efforts of burgeoning Kenyan political parties in fomenting change, the Mau Mau took to the forests and launched a guerrilla-style insurgency, which lasted until 1956.¹⁷ Casualties were highest among the Kikuyu population, in part due to a civil war between the rebels and the loyalist "Home Guards."¹⁸ The Emergency was extended beyond 1956 to January 1960, as the government dealt with more than 80,000 detainees then held in Kenya's extensive system of prisons and internment camps. It was a period of penal extremes: Kenya experienced the highest rate of incarceration in any British colony and also the highest number of capital sentences.¹⁹

Women played a central, though an often underestimated role in the rebellion. Mau Mau represented the apex of women's political involvement in the colonial period. Historians such as historians Presley and Kanogo have demonstrated the depth and breadth of women's military, political, and domestic roles in the rebellion.²⁰ Some were

engaged as fighters in the Mau Mau forces, operating in an environment where gender norms were in flux and taking advantage of the opportunities for involvement in combat. One famously rose to the rank of Field Marshall, though most, especially young girls, saw limited military engagement.²¹ On the civilian front, women could be members of the Mau Mau councils that made decisions about the movement, or involved in the Mau Mau High Courts that dealt with anti-Mau Mau crimes.²² The most significant element of women's participation in the civilian effort was through the "passive wing," a network of "couriers, scouts, and spies" that aided Mau Mau forest fighters by providing supplies, food, ammunition, and information.²³

Initially, the British had not expected women to pose a threat in the rebellion. In part, this myopia stemmed from the government's belief that African women were passive, peaceful, and uninterested in politics, reflecting the androcentric views about violence widely held in colonial Africa. This is apparent in a report by the District Commissioner of Kiambu in 1950, in which he expressed his shock at reports of women's involvement in oathing, a Kikuyu practice transformed to facilitate for Mau Mau recruitment. "Women," he wrote, "were proceeding with the work of oath giving," an activity "utterly contrary to Kikuyu custom."²⁴ As the colonial officials began to realize the extent of women's involvement, their shock grew. In a 1953 intelligence report, such feelings were clear: "The attitude of the women of the tribe towards the Emergency was, in general, particularly distressing."²⁵ Officials were particularly concerned with the passive wing, acknowledging that the "part played by women to aid the terrorists is considerable."²⁶ Thomas Askwith, the head of the department charged with rehabilitation of Mau Mau detainees, viewed women's roles as pivotal: "It is believed that at the present time they are keeping Mau Mau alive," he remarked in 1953.²⁷

In response to these concerns, the colonial administration set forth a plan to stem the contributions of women to the movement, settling on two tactics for controlling women's activities.²⁸ The first tactic was forced villagization. In June 1954, the decision was made to relocate the population of the Kikuyu reserves into newly created villages.²⁹ Less than a year and a half later, over one million Kikuyu men, women and children had been placed in approximately 800 of these villages.³⁰ Although a rehabilitation program was then meant to occur in the villages, in reality the conditions were akin to detention. As Elkins writes, "Surrounded by barbed wire and spiked trenches, heavily guarded by armed Home Guards and watchtowers, and routinized by sirens and daily forced labour, these villages were also detention camps in all but name."³¹

The second tactic was the removal of women suspected of Mau Mau activities through the implementation of detention orders. Largely ignored in the first months of the Emergency, by the close of 1954, a new section of Nairobi's Kamiti Prison was operational as a women's only detention camp.³² This installation, named Kamiti Detention Camp, allowed women to be detained on a much larger scale: by the end of the Emergency, some 8000 women would pass through Kamiti and the one or two other camps where smaller groups of women were held.³³ Gitamayu, built as a satellite of Kamiti, was used for the interrogation and treatment of hardcore Mau Mau women from among the community incarcerated at Kamiti. These two camps were the only installations used exclusively for the detention of women.

With the decision in 1954 to detain suspected Mau Mau adherents *en masse*, the colonial administration also settled on a policy for the "rehabilitation" of detainees. This program, first modeled on the strategies used by the British in Malaya to remake Communist rebels into obedient subjects, was meant to assuage criticisms of the detention camp system by showing evidence of a "civilizing" effort.³⁴ At the heart of this policy was what Dane Kennedy has termed the "myth of Mau Mau."³⁵ Developed by a committee of so-called

“experts,” including anthropologist Louis Leakey and psychiatrist J.C. Carothers, the myth constructed the rebellion as a pathological rather than political phenomenon.³⁶ This expert team diagnosed the Mau Mau as a disease brought on by “detrribalization,” or by the African subjects’ inability to handle to the colonial offerings of modernity and development.³⁷ Carothers, Leakey and other members of the Rehabilitation Committee provided the “scientific” evidence that the Mau Mau was a product of mental illness rather than legitimate political grievances. Their team would “write the prescription” for Mau Mau’s cure, developing a rehabilitation program that would purge the rebels of their mental illness and help the British to justify large-scale detention without trial.³⁸

With the construction of Kamiti, a rehabilitation policy was devised targeting female Mau Mau adherents. Though features of the policy in place for males were implemented, rehabilitation at Kamiti was shaped by British assumptions about women’s domestic nature.³⁹ In the scheme for women’s rehabilitation drawn up between 1954 and 1955, considerable emphasis was placed on women’s positions as mothers and homemakers. Rehabilitation at Kamiti proceeded in several stages. First, women were classified through “screening” at separate camps.⁴⁰ Those perceived as most committed to the Mau Mau cause, the “hardcore,” were labeled “black” or “dark gray” and sent to Kamiti. Those considered as less deviant were sent to works camps to be released after a period of labor for the government. Once in Kamiti, hardcore women were quickly separated into five compounds – *Hiti*, *Mburi*, *Njau*, *Mori*, and *Ng’ombe* – graded from most to least “deviant.”⁴¹ Those who confessed to Mau Mau involvement were then entered into the rehabilitation program. Like the men, women would receive some basic literacy and civics education, as well as agricultural training. However, the rest of their rehabilitation had a specifically domestic focus, with training in hygiene, embroidery, gardening, cooking, and child welfare.⁴² This was in contrast to the men’s activities, which included carpentry, tailoring, cobbling, farming, and animal husbandry.⁴³

The British felt that the rehabilitation program would quickly bear results, an optimism stemming from their reliance on gender stereotypes. Women, they assumed, were malleable and easily influenced by those around them. Many colonial officials believed that women had become involved in Mau Mau only because of their husbands and would thus have been easily swayed to disown the movement. Rather than interpreting women’s involvement as genuine and motivated by their own political concerns, the colonizers instead saw it as a product of male persuasion. Askwith, in particular, emphasized the importance of male influences on women’s participation in the Mau Mau: “The women have, of course, far less knowledge than the men and have been easily swayed by the Mau Mau leaders,” he wrote.⁴⁴ In a Rehabilitation Progress Report in December 1954, Askwith made a similar comment, postulating that women’s rehabilitation would proceed speedily due to their permeability to male influence: “it may be safely assumed that the women will in due course follow obediently the dictates of their husbands as they have done hitherto.”⁴⁵ Such a view would be severely tested behind Kamiti’s walls.

Handling the hardcore

Despite British assumptions about female detainees’ malleability, it was clear by early 1955 that rehabilitation was not progressing smoothly. Eileen Fletcher, a Quaker with nearly two decades of experience in social work and psychiatry, had been appointed to assist in implementing the female rehabilitation policy.⁴⁶ Several months into her work, Fletcher began to express her doubts about the ease of rehabilitating women. In her opinion, the Mau Mau had “gone very deep” with the women, and many of Kamiti’s

detainees were hardcore.⁴⁷ Just over a year into women's detention at Kamiti, Fletcher made it clear that "the task of rehabilitating these women is an extremely hard one."⁴⁸ Despite the expectations of some officials, Fletcher protested that the challenges could not "be dealt with through friendly cups of tea."⁴⁹ Having failed to inaugurate any changes at Kamiti, Fletcher would go on to resign her position, embarking upon a campaign in Britain to publicize the mistreatment of women and juveniles in Kenya's detention camps.⁵⁰ The official response in Britain dismissed Fletcher as eccentric and her complaints as misguided and malicious.⁵¹

Fletcher's fears about the hardcore women, nonetheless, reflected an emerging concern among other detention camp staff working elsewhere in the colony. Of all the detainees, both male and female, the hardcore group elicited the most concern, exciting hyperbole from British officials. Despite being one of the more liberal among British officials in Kenya, Askwith expressed his sense of horror toward the hardcore males. "They wore their hair long and matted," he wrote in his memoirs, and "their eyes seemed to become elongated and yellow" – a phenomenon referred to as "leopard eyes."⁵² In Askwith's mind, such people were beyond the reach of rehabilitation, part of the inevitable "residue who were fanatic in their adherence to the cause of violence."⁵³ Such people, he commented, were destined to stay in detention "indefinitely."⁵⁴

Such attitudes were symptomatic of a tougher approach to male hardcore detainees introduced from early in 1957. At the outset of the year, a conference entitled "The Hardcore Detainee" was held in Nairobi, bringing together those involved in rehabilitation to discuss the way forward.⁵⁵ A speech from colonial official L.B. Greaves, stationed at Perkerra camp, revealed the administration's increasingly militant attitude toward the hardcore. "As is now well known," Greaves opined, "the problem of the hardcore detainee presents a difficulty which necessitates a different angle of approach from that which we use with the softer types ... the Prison regulations may have to be stretched considerably."⁵⁶ Greaves' words engaged considerable approval and would reflect a significant policy shift in the government's approach to the hardcore detainees. As Greaves suggested, the regulations governing the use of physical force in the camps was amended and from 1957 the hardcore detainees found themselves confronted by the violence and aggressive prison regime, designed explicitly to compel them to obey orders and carry out instructions.⁵⁷ Though violence had been a prevalent feature of Kenya's camps since their inception, it had previously proceeded in a random and haphazard manner, either tacitly condoned by the officers in certain camps, or carried on but ignored in others. From 1957 this would change, beginning with the implementation of what became known as the "dilution technique" in the Mwea camps.⁵⁸ Described in detail by Elkins, "dilution" explicitly allowed the use of "compelling force" to ensure compliance.⁵⁹ With the implementation of "dilution," force was officially sanctioned, becoming a "systematic pattern of state policy."⁶⁰

The release of the Hanslope files has allowed us now to see that this change also had a direct impact upon female hardcore detainees, providing much more information about the detention of this group in the latter stages of the Emergency Period than has been available in previous scholarly works. In essence, the same policy was applied, though in the case of the women at Kamiti and Gitamayu, it had some unique attributes. Efforts to eliminate the detainees' contribution to Mau Mau and to break their allegiance to the movement were the same for men and women, as was the strategy of concentrating small groups of hardcore detainees in smaller camps, in isolation from others – this was the rationale behind the creation of Gitamayu. The intensification of violence and abuse was also the same for both genders.⁶¹ But two features of the implementation of the women's policy were unique and both stemmed from gendered assumptions. First, the approach to

hardcore women was riven with and undermined by confusion and inconsistency, this reflecting British unease at having to deal with resistant women. Second, while the British persisted in seeing hardcore women as more redeemable than their male counterparts, those who were particularly recalcitrant were then condemned using tropes associated with extreme female deviancy, such as madness and witchcraft. The remainder of this article will examine, in detail, the manifestations of these gendered aspects of the rehabilitation policies at Kamiti and Gitamayu.

Sketches about the experience of hardcore women under this regime emerge from the archival sources, giving a sense as to *whom* exactly the British considered deviant and why. A female detainee discussed at length in the Hanslope papers is Sarah Serai, a politically active woman who was allegedly aligned with the “worst Nairobi criminal elements,” including Kenya’s future president, Jomo Kenyatta (then himself interned at Lokitaung).⁶² Serai was detained after authorities found a “large quantity of proscribed publications, drugs, KAU and Mau Mau documents, knives and belts” in her home.⁶³ The administration felt that they were “not going to get any further with her” in detention but were also reluctant to let her return to Nairobi, as “she could only have a bad influence on the general security and crime of the city.”⁶⁴ A woman by the name of Cecilia was similarly infamous at Kamiti. In an article in the British *Sunday Post* newspaper, she is referred to as the “worst black” at Kamiti.⁶⁵ Cecilia was renowned as having served as a Mau Mau High Court Judge, prosecuting those accused of being informers and collaborators and sentencing some to death. A report from the East African Women’s League described the women of the Mau Mau High Court as the “most brutal” of all Kamiti detainees, decrying how they had “condemned innocent men and women of their own tribe to death,” often carrying out the sentences themselves.⁶⁶ While Serai and Cecilia could be identified as “criminals,” some of the most problematic detainees discussed in the Hanslope materials were those described as “witches.” A letter from Katherine Warren-Gash, the commandant of the women’s camp at Kamiti, revealed in 1957 that there were a “number of witches of varying quality” among the hardcore detainees and were considered “particularly dangerous.”⁶⁷ Those identified as witches were cordoned off in a special section of Kamiti, so as to avoid further contamination of other detainees.⁶⁸

This diverse mix of detainees made up the “nucleus” of hardcore women at Kamiti, by August 1957 numbering a total of 162 “very fanatical” detainees.⁶⁹ The Hanslope papers reveal how the British adopted a range of tactics to deal with these so-called fanatics. One method was to increase contact with the world beyond Kamiti’s walls. Warren-Gash traveled out to the Kikuyu rural areas, for example, meeting detainees’ families and encouraging them to write letters urging their interned relatives to confess to their alleged crimes.⁷⁰ In addition, regular visits from Athi River camp detainees and interviews with “Screening Elders” were organized in an effort to “change the attitudes of the difficult characters we have and turn them to people who respond to rehabilitation.”⁷¹

Other tactics included segregation and exile. Detainees were divided according to Kikuyu age groups, thus safeguarding younger women from the “suspected older trouble-makers.”⁷² However, in the endemic overcrowding of Kamiti, separation proved nearly impossible, with the hardcore separated from the others by only “a single strand fence.”⁷³ Exile was another potential way to divide more and less cooperative detainees. This had been used earlier in the Emergency for male detainees considered irredeemable. Warren-Gash favored this option: “No more can be done with these Hard Core at the moment,” she lamented, “so I recommend that they be sent into exile to some fairly inaccessible place as far away from the Kikuyu country as possible.”⁷⁴ “After a period in exile,” she wrote, “it is possible that some of them will return to a reasonable state of mind and so

can then be rehabilitated.”⁷⁵ This was one of the first times that a senior staff member at Kamiti had indicated that hardcore women may not be redeemable and that the whole scheme of rehabilitation might indeed be impracticable. This crucial shift in thinking would gain momentum in the early months of 1958. Furthermore, Warren-Gash’s comment that the hardcore were not in a “reasonable state of mind” was indicative of the administration’s increasing tendency to question the mental stability of female detainees, a view that would become influential at Gitamayu.

Warren-Gash’s suggestion of exile stimulated a considerable debate over the movement of Kamiti women, reflecting new layers of tensions in how to deal with these detainees. In the latter half of 1957, a series of rather futile shuffles of women ensued. Some administrators strove to keep the hardcore women at Kamiti, whereas others wanted them dispersed. F.A. Loyd, the Provincial Commissioner of the Central Province, characterized the women as “rejects with whom nothing more can be done at present, and whose presence at Kamiti is doing more harm than good.”⁷⁶ By the end of August, 164 women had been temporarily moved to Mile 37 Camp at Kajiado.⁷⁷ Less than three months later, the majority of these detainees were returned.⁷⁸

Commissioner of Prisons, J.S. Lewis, urged that a resolution be found, one that did not involve Kamiti: “the time seems to have arrived when the future of these hardcore women should be decided. Obviously we cannot keep them at Kamiti for ever and a day...”⁷⁹ There was some discussion of moving 30–40 women to Hola Detention Camp to join male hardcore detainees, but no action was immediately taken.⁸⁰ Instead, it was decided to set up a satellite camp to Kamiti at Gitamayu.

Gitamayu

It was Terence Gavaghan, the architect of the “dilution technique” and the District Commissioner of Kiambu, who provided Kamiti’s staff with a solution to the remaining hardcore women. On paying a visit to Kamiti in June 1958, Gavaghan assessed the remainder of the hardcore female detainees and separated them into “those beyond redemption” and those “potentially though not actually responsive.”⁸¹ This marked a crucial turning point in the British approach to hardcore women, as they finally relinquished their fervent belief that *all* female detainees were inherently redeemable. A group of 16 “thugs and witches,” considered to be “very bad” hardcore women, was officially written off, destined to languish in Kamiti indefinitely.⁸² With these “unregenerates” put aside at Kamiti, those women deemed potentially responsive were moved⁸³ to Gitamayu, a satellite post of Kamiti, housed in the renovated Kiambu Tribal Police Training Centre.⁸⁴

The traces of Gitamayu have proved elusive. Gavaghan never discusses it in his memoir, *Of Lions and Dungbeetles*, suggesting his awareness of sensitive nature of the camp.⁸⁵ Mentioned only once, as “Githimayo,” in the parliamentary Hansard, it has not been located in other archival records in Britain or in Kenya until the recent release of the Hanslope materials.⁸⁶ Among the Hanslope papers on Kamiti, Gitamayu is the subject of over two dozen documents, which are designated as “secret” and “confidential.” These documents make it clear that Gavaghan’s plan was indeed implemented.

Under his direction, small groups of approximately 20 women each were brought from Kamiti to Gitamayu to undergo intensive rehabilitation.⁸⁷ At Gitamayu, a staff of “forthright, loyal women” was trained to “encourage the detainees by friendly persuasion to abandon their sullen and aggressive attitudes.”⁸⁸ Rehabilitation began with an “initial spell of very hard work.”⁸⁹ Detainees who were found to be “responding to discipline” were then interviewed one-on-one, rather than being formally screened.⁹⁰ The women did

not have to provide confessions of their involvement in Mau Mau, for Gavaghan considered that they had “remained sullen and stagnant for so long that such confessions, if made at all, would merely be lip-service in the interest of release.”⁹¹ The “agreeable” detainees were allowed to “talk and sew and make baskets” with the loyalist women.⁹² Progress through Gitamayu’s pipeline was possible if the women displayed “an acceptable standard of human behavior” – a vague benchmark that left much room for subjective interpretation by the staff.⁹³

The regime imposed at Gitamayu was lauded as an innovative approach to dealing with the hardcore women. As had previously been encouraged in the “Hardcore Detainee” Conference in early 1957, this was the “different angle of approach” deemed necessary to deal with the hardcore detainees, and it is significant that Gavaghan was the official responsible for both the “dilution technique” for male detainees at Mwea and the scheme implemented at Gitamayu.⁹⁴

Broken bodies

As a consequence of the recent legal proceedings brought against the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office by Kenyan plaintiffs, who alleged that they had been the victims of torture during detention in Kenya, there is now incontrovertible evidence of the systematic abuse carried out in the camps in the 1950s. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office conceded this point when announcing the out-of-court settlement in favor of the plaintiffs, and more than 5000 other claimants, in June 2013: “Kenyans were subject to torture and other forms of ill treatment at the hands of the colonial administration” during the Mau Mau years.⁹⁵ Such abuses reached a peak in the final years of the Emergency, from 1957 to 1959, as can be seen from the Hanslope records we now have for Gitamayu and for Kamiti.⁹⁶ However, British behavior at the time involved concealment, significant steps being taken to cover up government actions using tactics that reflected their gendered perceptions of deviance. This is vividly evident in the attempts by British officials to label women’s actions at Kamiti and Gitamayu as a problem of mental health, labeling them as “mad” in an effort to cover up the violent treatment used against them.⁹⁷

This link between “madness” and abuse became manifest in ways that reflected widely held colonial stereotypes about violent women. As Hynd argues in her work on capital punishment in colonial Kenya and Nyasaland, “there was a strong correlation drawn in European minds between violent African female criminality and mental instability or illness.”⁹⁸ This was shaped by both “androcentric criminological perspectives which located female criminality in women’s biological characteristics, and popular ‘ethnopsychiatric’ views that viewed Africans as inherently unstable, lacking self-control, and prone to violent outbursts and ‘manias.’”⁹⁹ Colonial logic assumed that a woman, by nature nonviolent, could not commit such a heinous act if she was sane. Mau Mau’s hardcore women were perceived as violent and extreme and so were deemed to be suffering from “madness.”

Unlike the earlier accounts of rehabilitation at Kamiti, reports from Gitamayu are laden with discussions on women’s health. Doctors were regularly called in to assess detainees’ supposed physical and mental ailments. In these assessments, mental instability was one of the most consistent diagnoses. It was most commonly linked to demonstrations of physical incapacity, such as lameness and dumbness, which the British interpreted in multiple ways. There are three possibilities for such behaviors based on the evidence available: resistance, psychological trauma, and physical abuse. In Gitamayu, “madness” had many meanings, and it is only through a careful analysis of the evidence that these become clearer.

At times, the British read detainees' lameness and dumbness as resistance. According to a report on Gitamayu of November 1958, the "noncooperatives" could be "easily identified by their refusal to speak except among themselves, and in some cases their pathological inability to walk"¹⁰⁰ Officials claimed that the detainees were pretending to be ill as a form of deliberate disobedience:

It is our experience that certain "hardcore" women resent any attempt to prepare them for release (as has happened among the men) and will go to any lengths to obstruct efforts which are made to do so. Simulation of ill-health and incapacity is a common method used.¹⁰¹

Whether or not these women were using these physical acts as a form of resistance is impossible to discern from the archival record. What is salient, however, is that the British linked female deviance with their bodies, thus framing it more as a pathological rather than political issue. In this case, the British saw women's resistance as manifested in the somatic sphere, rather than the more advanced intellectual one, reducing the rationality of such acts.

Another possibility for these behaviors was psychological trauma due to physical and sexual abuse in the camps.¹⁰² Certainly, conditions of the detention camps could have induced trauma in detainees. In her pamphlets released in 1956 exposing abuse in the camps, Eileen Fletcher took up the theme of trauma and discussed some of the reasons for its prevalence among female detainees. For example, Fletcher recounted the "stark terror" in the eyes of juvenile detainees at Kamiti after being released from 16 days of solitary confinement.¹⁰³ This observation was echoed in the recent court testimony of Jane Muthoni Mara, the female plaintiff in the case brought against the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who remains "extremely traumatized" by the physical and sexual abuse she experienced while in detention.¹⁰⁴ This included being whipped, having stones thrown at her, being stepped on by guards and having a "glass soda bottle" filled with hot water pushed into her vagina.¹⁰⁵ Such experiences continue to impact her today. Mara informed the court that she still has visions of "people running towards me with big sticks as if they are about to hit me. This lasts for about 2 to 5 minutes and when this happens I have severe headache and not able to think any more."¹⁰⁶ She also has "visions of being sexually attacked even when I was having physical relations with my husband."¹⁰⁷ These flashbacks began several years after she was released from detention and occur on at least a weekly basis, showing the extent of her trauma.¹⁰⁸

The lameness and dumbness displayed by women at Gitamayu may have been a sign of trauma, or an act of resistance, but a third, more straightforward reason for lameness may be found in the physical abuse suffered by detainees. In the letter of complaint that was smuggled out of the camp in 1958 and found its way on to the desk of Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Gitamayu detainees described the beatings they suffered and asked a simple question: "We want to know who have given this men permission to do that? So why are we beat like that?"¹⁰⁹ According to these women, lameness was not a manifestation of trauma, or a show of resistance, but rather an outcome of violence. There is corroboration for this from the records of male detention camps, where medical reports are laden with accounts of lameness. For example, in Manyani, one report alone on "chronically sick" detainees included those who were suffering from "broken legs," "paralyzed legs," "feeble legs," "broken knees," a "fractured thigh," "defective joints," a "fractured waist," "deformed joints," "no legs," a "broken foot," and a heel that was "cut off."¹¹⁰ And once again, in Mara's High Court testimony we find an echo of the archival record: Mara finds it "difficult to walk" due to "sharp pain" in the back of her legs incurred through

guards stepping on her.¹¹¹ She also described being “struck on the right side of my back above my hip with a gun butt” while in detention, after which she could “barely stand.”¹¹² The link between violent treatment and lameness seems irrefutable, and while we cannot discern the precise extent of violence at Gitamayu camp on an individual basis, the records we now have indicate that it represented a normal aspect of the daily conduct of affairs.

Gitamayu was characterized as an “experiment,” emphasizing the break with past practices.¹¹³ Other colonial officers referred to it as an “unorthodox” approach,¹¹⁴ with a “revolutionary aspect.”¹¹⁵ Writing in October 1958, Terence Gavaghan urged that Gitamayu’s staff “continue until every possibility of dealing with the women ... has been exhausted.”¹¹⁶ The Governor of Kenya explained that, “Normal rehabilitation methods were not considered appropriate” for the task of breaking down the “sullen and unresponsive state into which they had sunk.”¹¹⁷ All of these references intimate that staff were encouraged to push to the limits of the regulations and employ what methods, and whatever force, might be required to gain compliance from the inmates. But official reports from Gitamayu are at pains to point out that illegal methods were *not* being used. For example, a report from late 1958 emphasized that “At no time has there been a concerted effort to extract confessions” at Gitamayu.¹¹⁸ In a further assessment, Gavaghan commented, “the suggestion that there has been brutality and ill-treatment of these women is false.”¹¹⁹ In a handwritten note scribbled at the bottom of a letter on Gitamayu, one official wrote that there “appears to be nothing illegal” about the methods employed in the camp.¹²⁰ The point to be made here is, of course, that throughout this period officials believed that the use of violence, in the form of “compelling force,” was indeed sanctioned by the regulations governing the camps. Thus, to say that “nothing illegal” was being done was not a denial that violence was being employed.¹²¹

Despite the prevalence of violence in Gitamayu, British interpretations of detainees’ lameness and dumbness persistently rejected physical causes in favor of explanations that lay in the realm of mental health. A report from medical officer O.H. Killen in February 1959 contains an assessment of seven Gitamayu detainees who were reported to neither speak nor walk. Killen described the detainees as “surlly and uncooperative” and insisted that the atmosphere in Gitamayu was “worse than I had previously encountered even in the worst compounds in Manyani.”¹²² Killen provided mixed diagnoses for the detainees. He insisted that none showed any “physical abnormality” and was able to persuade several to walk using a stick.¹²³ He described detainee Gachina Nyambia Kahun as “apathetic and completely disinterested in her surroundings” and insisted that “through long disuse she had forgotten to walk properly and had little desire for recall.”¹²⁴ Four other women would neither walk nor talk and were admitted to a hospital for further examination and treatment. In a subsequent report by J.S. Simmance, the Officer-in-Charge of Gitamayu, the doctor’s assessment was loosely interpreted in layman’s terms: the women were “perfectly healthy,” but were “suffering from a psychological inhibition which makes it ‘difficult’ for them to walk.”¹²⁵ Thus, the detainees were dismissed as suffering from psychological problems, rather than physical injuries. However, based on the evidence of widespread violence in the detention camps, the symptoms experienced by these women were likely due to injuries or manifestations of trauma resulting from physical abuse.

This response brings into relief the ways in which British perceptions about deviant women became instrumentalized to cover up the conditions of the detention camps, in contrast to earlier perceptions of malleability that reflected sincere assumptions about how women would behave. The “madness” of female detainees was an idea that had obvious political utility, used to dismiss women’s resistance by pathologizing it while rejecting

alternative views about psychological trauma or physical punishment – both of which implied criticism of conditions in the camps. As Hynd argues, such colonial categorizations of “madness” were neither benign nor accidental, but rather “reinforced state power.”¹²⁶

Of “unsound” mind? The last of the hardcore women

By April 1959, 25 hardcore women who had “resisted all attempts to rehabilitate them” remained in detention.¹²⁷ Gitamayu closed that same month, as rehabilitation efforts by the staff there had “failed to make any impression” on the detainees.¹²⁸ The women were transferred to Kamiti, where one last effort was now made to have them designated as insane.¹²⁹ P.S. Garland, of the Office of the Chief Secretary, raised the question of “whether they should now be treated as mentally ill, which they probably are,” and requested that Dr. Edward Margetts, the head of psychiatry at Mathari Mental Hospital, “be asked to take them over as mental patients.”¹³⁰ To some extent, a similar approach was then also being mooted for the most recalcitrant male detainees. The Fair Committee Report, of August 1959, highlighted the importance of psychiatry in ensuring the successful rehabilitation of the hardcore detainees, arguing that they needed “skilled psychiatric treatment.”¹³¹ It was felt that some hardcore, referred to as “the ultimate residue,” were hopeless, but for those who were potentially redeemable, it was recommended bringing in a “team of therapeutic experts” and providing “a hospital in a special camp where small groups could be brought under close observation.”¹³² However, while such ideas were ultimately rejected for male detainees, who, it was decided, should be exiled because of their intrinsic danger to society, “deviant” women were indeed labeled as insane. Once again, the colonial response was gendered.

The issue of the sanity of the remaining female detainees was now fiercely debated. Initially, the Crown Counsel, Thompson, had argued that detainees could only be admitted to Mathari Mental Hospital on the recommendation of a medical officer.¹³³ However, impatience quickly grew with the medical establishment. In a letter dated 25 June 1959, Thompson asked the Director of Medical Services to provide a legal definition that could be used in classifying the women detainees: “Will you please define the meaning of the expression ‘of unsound mind’. ... [I]s it intended to include psychotic, psychoneurotic or psychopathic individuals?”¹³⁴ Subsequent correspondence expressed Thompson’s frustrations with “lengthy medical terms” and narrow definitions: “It seems to me that the D.M.S [Director of Medical Services] is making things as difficult as possible,” he wrote.¹³⁵ Instead of using a strict medical definition, Thompson argued for a more flexible one: “Is not the answer that there is not a legal definition of ‘unsound mind,’ and that the words bear the meaning which a normal individual would attribute to them”¹³⁶

Despite advocating for a looser definition of an “unsound mind,” Thompson ultimately concluded that only a medical officer could decide whether or not a female detainee could be admitted to Mathari Mental Hospital. This could be against the detainees’ will: Thompson had ruled out the use of the Mental Treatment Ordinance in this process because it required willingness on the part of the potential patient or their relatives, and he considered neither party likely to be “willing to co-operate in this respect.”¹³⁷ However, under Emergency Regulations, this ordinance could be circumvented if a medical officer determined that a female detainee was “of sufficiently unsound mind to justify removal to Mathari.”¹³⁸ Not for the first time, Kenya’s colonial administrators sought to bend the meaning of the law to their own purposes, using Emergency Regulations to condone otherwise illegal practices.

Though some members of the colonial administration pressed for the hardcore women to be classified as insane, others had doubts and concerns. In wake of the deaths of 11 male detainees at Hola Camp, in March 1959, Kenya's officials were aware that they were now under close scrutiny.¹³⁹ In June 1959, officials in the Ministry of African Affairs urged caution in defining the women as insane, saying "that it would be advisable to proceed slowly in the matter."¹⁴⁰ It was recommended that the matter be referred to upper-ranking colonial officials and the Security Council and that the support of the Church should be enlisted.¹⁴¹ It was important to ensure that "the ground is carefully prepared," in order to avoid the accusation that "we had, by detention, made lunatics of these persons."¹⁴²

There were also misgivings about whether or not to use electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) on female hardcore detainees. This treatment, which utilizes the administration of electric shocks to induce seizures, was widely used in both Britain and Kenya at the time, administered on average five hundred times a month at Mathari in 1958.¹⁴³ However, its use on hardcore female detainees was ultimately cast aside by colonial officials as being too "politically dangerous" and fraught with "political and legal difficulties."¹⁴⁴ This decision was likely in part due to colonial officials' mounting sensitivity to the criticism of their actions. Although ECT was commonly practiced, there had been controversies over its use in British colonies. In her work on colonial Zimbabwe, Jackson describes how Africans at Ingutsheni Mental Hospital in the late 1940s and early 1950s often considered ECT to be a form of punishment, leading one female patient to describe Ingutsheni as a "place for boiling people" in reference to her experience of ECT.¹⁴⁵ There were also concerns in this period that the deaths of African patients in Ingutsheni had been linked to this therapy.¹⁴⁶ British officials in Kenya may have been wary of igniting similar controversies if ECT was used on Mau Mau women. However, an even more likely reason for the decision not to use ECT on female detainees was the suspect nature of colonial attempts to classify detainees as mad, as such treatments would have been acceptable for patients who were genuinely considered mentally ill.

Ultimately, it was Kenya's professional medical establishment who settled the debate on detainees' mental health by rejecting any further attempt to medicalize the problem. In September 1959, the Medical Department deemed that there was "no sufficient reason for any of the female Mau Mau detainees at Kamiti to undergo psychiatric treatment."¹⁴⁷ The remaining hardcore Mau Mau women were instead shuffled off to various work camps in the Central Province, to begin their journey back to their homes and their families. The decision to reject psychiatric treatment for hardcore female detainees revealed numerous tensions within the colonial administration, as it contradicted earlier diagnoses by medical officers in Gitamayu about the causes of detainee lameness and clashed with the desires of political and legal authorities who wanted hardcore women classified as insane. It also illuminates the discordant use of mental health discourses in Kenya's detention camps: riven with inconsistency, utilized by different elements of the colonial administration for various instrumental purposes, and intimately intertwined with changing political concerns.

Conclusion

Hardcore Mau Mau women created a considerable challenge for the British between 1954 and 1960. Gitamayu Detention Camp, revealed through previously hidden archival sources, represented the most robust attempt to deal with the problem, but ultimately became a site of violent abuse against detainees. Colonial ideas about deviancy were pivotal in shaping the treatment of women at Kamiti and Gitamayu. Perceptions of female deviancy shifted over the trajectory of the Emergency, shaping the contours of colonial policy toward

female detainees. Initially, women were expected to remain on the sidelines of the Mau Mau movement. When the extent of their involvement was discovered, the administration assumed rehabilitation would progress quickly due to the women's perceived malleability. Such assumptions were rendered hollow as the struggle with hardcore women unfolded, culminating in the efforts to define recalcitrant Mau Mau women as "mad." The different elements of the colonial administration – medical, legal, and political – were often in conflict with each other over the detainees' mental state. There were also contradictory assessments within departments: at times the medical establishment seemed to pathologize detainees' physical symptoms, yet it ultimately deemed them not insane. These conflicts further underscore the degree to which the hardcore women perplexed the administration, shattering their expectations about the detainees' malleability.

The case of the hardcore women at Kamiti and Gitamayu shows the links between the classificatory and coercive elements of colonial power, which coalesced to justify the detention of Kenyan women and hide abuse against them. The discourses of "otherness" separating the Mau Mau women from the British were variously expressed along the fault lines of race, gender, power, "sanity," and freedom. Discourses of deviance were vital for legitimizing detention without trial and hiding its failures and abuses in Kenya, and especially so in relation to women. Such ideas had logic: labeling the Mau Mau woman as a "witch," "hardcore," or "mad," rendered her less human, thus breaking down the commonalities and opening up the spaces for repression that colonialism depended on. In the counterinsurgency against Mau Mau, that repression became the defining feature of the colonial system, a feature that had a distinctive impact upon women detainees.

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Notes

1. The National Archives of the UK (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO), London, [Foreign and Commonwealth Office](#) (FCO) 141/6324/93/4, "ALL Woman detainees" to Gordon Walker, 26 November 1958.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*
4. British Hansard, Written Answers (Commons), "Mau Mau Detainees, Hola Camp (Deaths)," HC Deb 09 April 1959 vol 603 cc356-8.
5. *Ibid.*
6. TNA: PRO FCO 141/6324/77/1, J.S. Simmance to Minister of African Affairs, 3 October 1958; TNA: PRO FCO 141/6324/120, Officer in Charge, Kamiti Downs Prison, Female Wing to Commissioner of Prisons, 30 April 1959.
7. See [Anderson](#), *Histories of the Hanged*; and [Elkins](#), *Britain's Gulag*.
8. [Anderson](#), "Mau Mau in the High Court."
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*

11. Otieno, *Mau Mau's Daughter*; Likimani, *Passbook Number F.47927*; Santoru, "The Colonial Idea of Women"; Elkins, *Britain's Gulag*; and Presley, *Kikuyu Women*. Presley's work, while the most in-depth, is the most problematic as she evaluates the Kamiti rehabilitation program as a success, thus inadvertently endorsing the British stereotype that women were malleable.
12. Kenyatta, *Suffering without Bitterness*; and Kariuki, *Mau Mau Detainee*.
13. Anderson, "British Abuse."
14. Elkins, *Britain's Gulag*; Santoru, "The Colonial Idea of Women"; and Presley, *Kikuyu Women*.
15. One example is Lipscomb, *White Africans*. A further discussion of settler discourse on the Mau Mau can be found in Clough, *Mau Mau Memoirs*, 33–42.
16. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, 9–53.
17. See Bennett, *Fighting the Mau Mau*.
18. See Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau*.
19. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, 354.
20. Presley, *Kikuyu Women*; and Kanogo, "Kikuyu Women," 78–96.
21. Kanogo, "Kikuyu Women," 89.
22. *Ibid.*, 94.
23. TNA: PRO FCO 141/6244/1/1, Ministry of Defence, "Female Mau Mau Terrorists, Memorandum by the Kenya Intelligence Committee," 4 November 1954; and Presley, *Kikuyu Women*.
24. Corfield, *Historical Survey*, 90.
25. Quoted in Presley, "Mau Mau," 298.
26. Kenya National Archives, Nairobi (KNA) DC/KBU 1/44, "Kiambu District Annual Report," 1953.
27. Askwith, *From Mau Mau to Harambee*, 106.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Sorrenson, *Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country*, 110–2.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Elkins, *Britain's Gulag*, xii.
32. Kamiti had accommodated female Mau Mau convicts and detainees earlier in Emergency Period, but in early 1954, it was suggested as the site for the main women's detention camp. By 20 November 1954, Kamiti had 2000 female Mau Mau convicts and detainees. See KNA AB/2/51/3 J.H. Lewis to Hon. Director of Public Works, 22nd March 1954; KNA AB/1/92/42, S.H. La Fontaine to Director of Information Services, 20 November 1954.
33. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, 313.
34. Elkins, "The struggle for Mau Mau rehabilitation," 34–5.
35. Kennedy, "Constructing the Colonial Myth," 241–60.
36. For more on Leakey see Berman and Lonsdale, "Louis Leakey's Mau Mau." On Carothers see McCulloch, *Colonial Psychiatry*, 64–76.
37. See Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, 279–284.
38. *Ibid.*, 282.
39. Santoru, "The Colonial Idea of Women," 265.
40. "Screening" was an often violent interrogation process carried out by security forces and other officers of the state to determine whether or not an individual suspected of Mau Mau involvement should be detained, and if those in detention were sufficiently rehabilitated to merit release. See Anderson, "British Abuse," 702.
41. Swahili terms for "hyena," "goat," a calf that is too young to determine its sex, a cow that has reached the milking stage, a fully-grown cow. See Elkins, *Britain's Gulag*, 223.
42. KNA AH/4/26/11/A, "Rehabilitation of Detained Persons," 1953.
43. *Ibid.*
44. Askwith, *From Mau Mau to Harambee*, 107.
45. KNA JZ/2/26/10, "Memorandum, Progress Report – Rehabilitation," 30 December 1954.
46. Archives and Special Collections, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), Conference of British Missionary Societies (CBMS) 278, E. Fletcher to Chief Secretary, 5th June 1955.
47. SOAS CBMS 278 E. Fletcher, "Proposed Scheme for the Rehabilitation of Women and Girls in the Prisons and Camps," February 1955. The CBMS collection at SOAS is the main site for Fletcher's papers.

48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. See SOAS CBMS 278, E. Fletcher, *The Truth about Kenya*.
51. For more on the British Government's response to Fletcher, see: Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, 323–4; and Elkins, *Britain's Gulag*, 291–4.
52. Rhodes House, Bodleian Library (RH) MSS. Afr.s.2155, Papers of T.G. Askwith, "Mau Mau: was it really necessary?" 1994.
53. RH MSS. Afr.s.1770/1, Papers of T.G. Askwith, *Memoirs of Kenya 1936–61*, 51.
54. Ibid.
55. KNA AB/2/23, "Rehabilitation Conference," January 7, 1957.
56. Ibid.
57. Anderson, "British Abuse," 707.
58. Ibid.
59. Elkins, *Britain's Gulag*, 319–332.
60. Anderson, "British Abuse," 700.
61. For more on the treatment of male detainees see Anderson, "British Abuse."
62. TNA PRO: FCO 141/6324/67, Director of Intelligence and Security to Permanent Secretary for African Affairs, 16 July 1958.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. KNA JZ/16/7/80, "The Biggest Women's Prison in the World," *Sunday Post*, June 1956.
66. KNA MAC/KEN/33/728, East African Women's League, "The Story of Kamiti Prison," 1956.
67. TNA PRO FCO/141/6324/25/1, Warren-Gash to Secretary of State for Community Development, 2 August 1957.
68. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/82, J.S. Simmance to Special Commissioner, Central Province, 26 November 1958.
69. KNA AB/1/112, "Annual Report for 1956"; TNA PRO FCO/141/6324/25/1, K. Warren-Gash to Secretary of State for Community Development, 2 August 1957.
70. KNA AB/1/92/140, Warren-Gash to Secretary for Community Development, 25 March 1957.
71. KNA AB/1/92/155, Henry Kuria to Secretary for Community Development, 31 July 1957.
72. KNA AB/1/92/140, Warren-Gash to Secretary for Community Development, 25 March 1957.
73. TNA PRO FCO/141/6324/25/1, Warren-Gash to Secretary for Community Development, 2 August 1957.
74. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/25/1, Warren-Gash to Secretary of State for Community Development, 2 August 1957.
75. Ibid.
76. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/25, F.A. Loyd to Secretary for Community Development, 9 August 1957.
77. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/32, "Hard Core Female Detainees," 27 August 1957.
78. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/35, "Hard Core Female Detainees," 29 October 1957.
79. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/36, J.S. Lewis to Ministry of African Affairs, 2 December 1957.
80. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/65, District Officer Hola to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of African Affairs, 8 July 1958.
81. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/82, J.S. Simmance to Special Commissioner, Central Province, 26 November 1958.
82. Ibid.
83. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/77/1, J.S. Simmance to Minister for African Affairs, 3 October 1958.
84. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6234/58, T. Gavaghan to Provincial Commissioner, Central Province, 5 June 1958.
85. Gavaghan, *Of Lions and Dungbeetles*.
86. British Hansard, Written Answers (Commons), "Detention Camps and Detained Persons," HC Deb 12 February 1959 vol 599 cc226-7W.
87. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/82, J.S. Simmance to Special Commissioner, Central Province, 26 November 1958.
88. Ibid.

89. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/77/1, J.S. Simmance to Minister for African Affairs, 3 October 1958.
90. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/82, J.S. Simmance to Special Commissioner, Central Province, 26 November 1958.
91. TNA PRO: FCO/141/6324/96, T. Gavaghan to Permanent Secretary for African Affairs, 20 February 1959.
92. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/77/1, J.S. Simmance to Minister for African Affairs, 3 October 1958.
93. TNA PRO: FCO/141/6324/96, T. Gavaghan to Permanent Secretary for African Affairs, 20 February 1959.
94. KNA AB/2/23, "Rehabilitation Conference," 7 January 1957.
95. *Foreign and Commonwealth Office*, "Statement to Parliament."
96. Anderson, "British Abuse," 701.
97. The link made by the British between dissent and madness was apparent prior to the Emergency Period. Between 1911 and the early 1950s, Kenyan prophets and visionaries seen as a threat to colonial power were described in "psychologized language" and deemed to be "neurotic" and "mad" See Mahone, "The Psychology of Rebellion," 241–258.
98. Hynd, "Deadlier than the Male?" 28.
99. *Ibid.*
100. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/82, J.S. Simmance to Special Commissioner, Central Province, 26 November 1958.
101. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/97, Governor to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 February 1959.
102. See Chapter 7 of Elkins, *Britain's Gulag* for a discussion of physical and sexual abuse in Kamiti.
103. SOAS CBMS 278, Eileen Fletcher to L.B. Greaves, 28 June 1956.
104. *Royal Courts of Justice*, *Witness Statement of Jane Muthoni*, 25.
105. *Ibid.*, 12–13.
106. *Ibid.*, 26.
107. *Ibid.*, 25.
108. *Ibid.*, 26.
109. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/93/4, "ALL Woman detainees" to Gordon Walker, 26 November 1958.
110. KNA AH/9/8/70, "Chronically Sick Detainees," 20 June 1956.
111. *Royal Courts of Justice*, *Witness Statement of Jane Muthoni*, 25.
112. *Ibid.*
113. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/77/1, J.S. Simmance to Minister for African Affairs, 3 October 1958.
114. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/77, District Commissioner Kiambu to Permanent Secretary for African Affairs, 6 October, 1958.
115. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/82, J.S. Simmance to Special Commissioner, Central Province, 26 November 1958.
116. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/77, District Commissioner Kiambu to Permanent Secretary for African Affairs, 6 October 1958.
117. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/97, Governor to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 February 1959.
118. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/82, J.S. Simmance to Special Commissioner, Central Province, 26 November 1958.
119. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/96, T.Gavaghan to the Permanent Secretary for African Affairs, 20 February 1959.
120. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/79, District Commissioner Kiambu to Permanent Secretary for African Affairs, 6 October 1958.
121. Anderson, "British Abuse," 714.
122. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/96/1, O.H. Killen to District Commissioner, Kiambu, 20 February 1959.
123. *Ibid.*
124. *Ibid.*

125. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/97/2, J.S. Simmance to District Commissioner, Kiambu, 20 February 1959.
126. Hynd, "Deadlier than the male?" 31. Where Mau Mau's women were condemned by their "madness," in other colonial examples, this was used as a tool for leniency. In Hynd's study, perceptions of madness are shown to have led to a more lenient treatment of female offenders on trial for capital punishment. She examines several cases of child murder in Kenya in the 1920s, in which mothers who murdered their children were found "guilty but insane," and had their sentences commuted, despite rationalizing their actions and having little medical evidence of insanity. McKittrick, "Faithful Daughter, Murdering Mother," reaches a similar conclusion, showing how an accused Ovambo woman was committed to a mental hospital and then allowed to live with her mother, despite flimsy medical evidence, and Zimudzi, "African Women," finds parallel treatment of women charged with spousal murders in colonial Zimbabwe, who would often be "recommended to mercy" because of the "irrational" nature of their crimes.
127. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/115, P.S. Garland to the Director of Medical Services, 21 April 1959.
128. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/121, P.S. Garland to the Honourable Attorney General, 16 May 1959.
129. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/115, P.S. Garland to Director of Medical Services, Nairobi, 21 April 1959.
130. Ibid.
131. KNA MSS 115/50/16, "Report of the Committee on Emergency Detention Camps," August 1959.
132. Ibid.
133. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/122, Crown Counsel to Permanent Secretary for African Affairs, 27 May 1959.
134. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/134/1, Crown Counsel for Director of Medical Services, 25 June 1959.
135. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/134, Crown Counsel to Garland, 30 June 1959.
136. Ibid.
137. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/122, Crown Counsel to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of African Affairs, 27 May 1959.
138. Ibid.
139. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, 326–7.
140. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/126, A.C. Small to P.S. Garland, 4 June 1959.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid.
143. McCulloch, *Colonial Psychiatry*, 28.
144. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/121, P.S. Garland to Attorney General, 16 May 1959; TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/117, P.S. Garland to Director of Medical Services, 23 April 1959.
145. Jackson, *Surfacing Up*, 175.
146. Ibid.
147. TNA: PRO FCO/141/6324/145, R.G. Wilson to Major J.B.W. Breckenridge, 10 September 1959.

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